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A MODEL-THEORETIC CHARACTERIZATION OF
MONADIC SECOND ORDER LOGIC ON INFINITE WORDS
SILVIO GHILARDI AND SAMUEL J. VAN GOOL
Abstract. Monadic second order logic and linear temporal logic are two logical for-
malisms that can be used to describe classes of infinite words, i.e., first-order models based
on the natural numbers with order, successor, and finitely many unary predicate symbols.
Monadic second order logic over infinite words (S1S) can alternatively be described
as a first-order logic interpreted in P(ω), the power set Boolean algebra of the natural
numbers, equipped with modal operators for ‘initial’, ‘next’ and ‘future’ states. We prove
that the first-order theory of this structure is the model companion of a class of algebras
corresponding to a version of linear temporal logic (LTL) without until.
The proof makes crucial use of two classical, non-trivial results from the literature,
namely the completeness of LTL with respect to the natural numbers, and the correspon-
dence between S1S-formulas and Bu¨chi automata.
§1. Introduction. Monadic second order logic over the natural numbers
with successor operation is a rather expressive, but still decidable formalism. The
decision result, originally due to Bu¨chi [2], makes use of a conversion between
logic and automata. The key idea is to view interpretations of unary predicates
over natural numbers as infinite words over a suitable alphabet: one can asso-
ciate an automaton with a formula, and vice versa, in such a way that, roughly
speaking, the automaton accepts exactly those infinite words that, viewed as
interpretations of second-order variables, satisfy the formula. Converting a for-
mula ϕ into an automaton Aϕ and then the automaton Aϕ again into a formula,
one does not get back the same formula ϕ, but a formula ϕ′ which is equivalent
to ϕ in the intended model of the natural numbers. Loosely speaking, one may
view ϕ′ as a kind of ‘normalization’ of ϕ. Morally, ϕ′ is an existential formula;
although this is not formally true, the ‘existential nature’ of ϕ′ is rather evi-
dent. Nevertheless, in order to make ϕ′ into an actual existential formula, an
enlargement of the language is needed.
In this paper we make the above observations precise, which allows us to fit
monadic second order logic into the framework of modern model-theoretic al-
gebra (Robinson’s legacy [14]), using the concepts of model completeness and
model companions. We briefly recall these concepts now; precise definitions are
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given in Section 2. Theories T ∗ with the property that every formula is equiva-
lent modulo T ∗ to an existential (equivalently: to a universal) formula are called
model complete; model complete theories T ∗ can also be characterized seman-
tically by requiring that all embeddings between models of T ∗ are elementary.
Algebraically closed fields and real closed fields are classical examples of model
complete theories (see, e.g., [16] for many further examples). Moreover, as the
previous paragraph indicates, monadic second order logic, viewed as the first-
order theory of P(ω), is close to being model complete; we will see later in this
paper (Section 4) that it actually becomes model complete in an enriched lan-
guage. If T is the set of universal consequences of a model complete theory T ∗,
then T ∗ axiomatizes the class of structures which, as models of T , are existen-
tially closed : for the case of algebraically closed fields, T is the theory of integral
domains, for the case of real closed fields, T is the theory of formally real fields,
etc. In this situation, T ∗ is called a model companion of T .
In this paper, we exhibit a natural enrichment of the language of monadic
second order logic, viewed as the first-order theory of P(ω), so that the theory
becomes model complete. Moreover, we axiomatize the underlying universal
fragment, i.e., the universal theory T of which monadic second order logic over
natural numbers is the model companion. Our idea is to use modal and temporal
logic to attain this goal. More precisely: we will use a variant of the modal logic
LTL (‘linear temporal logic’ [12]) with an actual instant of time (i.e. with an atom
for zero) and without until; i.e., we have a basic modal logic with a reachability
operator and one additional constant.1 We introduce a universal class of algebras
algebraizing this logic and we show that this class fits our purposes. Indeed, this
class is axiomatized by a theory T admitting a model companion T ∗ which is
exactly monadic second order logic over the natural numbers (Theorem 2.2). In
order to establish this result, we shall make use, besides automata techniques, of
standard modal logic machinery, in particular, duality and filtrations [3, 9, 10].
The paper is organized in the following way: in Section 2 we state our result,
in the (rather technical) Section 3 we give the part of the proof requiring modal
logic techniques (completeness of the axiomatization) and in Section 4 the part
of the proof requiring automata theory ingredients (model completeness of the
theory in the enriched language). Section 5 concludes and indicates directions
for future work.
§2. Definitions and statement of the main theorem. In the following
definition, we introduce the relevant class of algebras.
Definition 2.1. A (♦,X, I)-algebra is a tuple (A,∨,¬,⊥,♦,X, I), where
(A,∨,¬,⊥) is a Boolean algebra, ♦ is a unary normal modal operator on A (i.e.,
a (∨,⊥)-semilattice endomorphism of A), X is a Boolean endomorphism of A, I
is an element of A \ {⊥}, and, for any a ∈ A, the following conditions hold:
1 The reason for leaving out the Until operator is that we opted for as small a language as
possible; Until is not needed for our purpose of expressing the Bu¨chi acceptance condition. In
fact, any operator definable in monadic second order logic over the natural numbers could be
added to our T (together with its axiomatization) without affecting our results.
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(i) ♦a = a ∨X♦a,
(ii) if Xa ≤ a then ♦a ≤ a,
(iii) if a 6= ⊥ then I ≤ ♦a.
(iv) XI = ⊥.
The class of (♦,X, I)-algebras (which is a universal class) algebraizes a version
of linear temporal logic without the until connective and with a constant I for
‘initial element’. The structure of (♦,X, I)-algebras will be studied in detail in
Section 3.
An important example of a (♦,X, I)-algebra is the power set algebra of the
natural numbers, P(ω), equipped with the usual Boolean operations, and the
operations ♦S := {n ∈ ω | n ≤ s for some s ∈ S}, XS := {n ∈ ω | n+ 1 ∈ S},
and I := {0}. We will see in Section 4 that first-order formulas in the signature
of (♦,X, I)-algebras, interpreted in P(ω), are interdefinable with formulas in the
system S1S, monadic second order logic over the natural numbers with order and
successor relations.
If T and T ∗ are first-order theories in the same signature, recall that T ∗
is called a model companion of T if (i) the theories T and T ∗ have the same
universal consequences (i.e., T ∗ is a companion or co-theory of T ) and (ii) any
first-order formula is equivalent over T ∗ to an existential formula (i.e., T ∗ is
model complete). The model companion of T is unique if it exists, and in this
case it is the theory of the existentially closed T -models [16].
Our main theorem is the following.
Theorem 2.2. The first-order theory of the (♦,X, I)-algebra P(ω) is the model
companion of the first-order theory of (♦,X, I)-algebras.
In the rest of this paper, we denote by T the first-order theory of (♦,X, I)-
algebras, and by T ∗ the first-order theory of the (♦,X, I)-algebra P(ω). In
Section 3, we prove that T ∗ is a companion of T . In Section 4, we prove that T ∗
is model complete. Together, these two sections prove Theorem 2.2.
§3. T ∗ is a companion of T . In this section, we prove that T ∗ is a com-
panion of T , i.e., that T and T ∗ have the same universal consequences.
Notation. Throughout this section, we denote by L = {∨,¬,⊥,♦,X, I} the
first-order signature of (♦,X, I)-algebras. We employ the usual abbreviations
a∧b := ¬(¬a∨¬b), ✷a := ¬♦¬a, a→ b := ¬a∨b, and a↔ b := (a→ b)∧(b→ a).
We begin with a useful observation: in the theory T , we can reduce quantifier-
free L-formulas to single equations.
Lemma 3.1. For any quantifier-free L-formula ϕ, there exists an L-term t
such that ϕ is equivalent to t = ⊤ in T .
Proof. Observe that, for any element w in a (♦,X, I)-algebra, we have
w 6= ⊤ if, and only if, I ≤ ♦¬w if, and only if, I → ♦¬w = ⊤. (*)
Let ϕ be a quantifier-free formula. We may assume that ϕ is a disjunction of
formulas ψ1, . . . , ψn, where each ψj is a conjunction of literals, i.e., has the form
rj1 6= s
j
1 and . . . and r
j
k 6= s
j
k and u
j
1 = v
j
1 and . . . and u
j
ℓ = v
j
ℓ ,
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where the rji , s
j
i , u
j
i , v
j
i are L-terms. Define the L-terms
tj :=
k∧
i=1
(I → ♦¬(rji ↔ s
j
i )) ∧
ℓ∧
i=1
(uji ↔ v
j
i ), t := I →
n∨
j=1
✷tj .
Using (*) and basic facts about Boolean algebras, we obtain that ψj is equivalent
in T to tj = ⊤, so ϕ is equivalent in T to the disjunction (t1 = ⊤ or ... or tn = ⊤).
This disjunction, in turn, is equivalent in T to t = ⊤, as can be proved easily
using (*) again, together with the axioms ✷⊤ = ⊤ and I 6= ⊥. ⊣
In order to prove that T ∗ is a companion of T , since T ⊆ T ∗, it suffices to prove
that any universal formula that is valid in P(ω) is valid in any (♦,X, I)-algebra.
Therefore, by Lemma 3.1, it is enough to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. If t is an L-term and P(ω) |= t = ⊤, then, for any (♦,X, I)-
algebra A, A |= t = ⊤.
In the rest of this section, we prove Theorem 3.2. The proof we give here
is an adaptation to our setting of the standard completeness theorem for LTL
with respect to ω; in particular, it is directly inspired by the proof given in
[10, Ch. 9]. Our proof of Theorem 3.2 is structured as follows. We will first
show, in Theorem 3.4, that (♦,X, I)-algebras can be represented as dual al-
gebras of (♦,X, I)-spaces (Definition 3.3), by means of an adaptation of the
standard (Stone-)Jo´nsson-Tarski representation theorem. We then combine this
theorem with an adaptation of a filtration argument for LTL (Lemma 3.8) to
prove Theorem 3.2.
Below, we use the following notational conventions for a preorder (= set en-
dowed with a reflexive and transitive relation) (X,≤). We define x < y as (x ≤ y
and x 6= y); for Y ⊆ X , we write ↑Y := {x ∈ X | y ≤ x for some y ∈ Y }, and
similarly ↓Y ; finally, for x ∈ X , we write ↑x and ↓x as shorthand for ↑{x} and
↓{x}, respectively.
We will now formulate the duality between algebras and general frames (viewed
as Stone spaces) that we need here. Our exposition will be brief, as we are only
using standard modal logic machinery. We refer to, e.g., [1, Ch. 5], for more
details on duality for modal algebras. To motivate the definition of (♦,X, I)-
spaces, observe that the ♦-reduct of a (♦,X, I)-algebra is an S4-algebra. Through
Jo´nsson-Tarski representation, S4-algebras correspond to Boolean spaces equipped
with a topological preorder, i.e., a preorder such that ↑x is closed for any point
x and ↓K is clopen for any clopen set K (see, e.g., [5, Rem. 1 in Sec. 2.6]). The
additional structure and properties of (♦,X, I)-algebras now correspond to ad-
ditional structure and properties of these preordered Boolean spaces, as follows.
Definition 3.3. We define a (♦,X, I)-space2 to be a tuple (X,≤, f, x0), where
X is a Boolean topological space, ≤ is a topological preorder on X , f : X → X
is a continuous function, x0 ∈ X is a point such that {x0} is clopen, and, for
any x, y ∈ X and clopen K ⊆ X :
2Note that our definition of (♦,X, I)-spaces makes crucial use of the second-order structure
(topology) on the underlying Kripke frames. This is necessarily so: the class of (♦,X, I)-
algebras is not canonical, so it can not be dual to an elementary class of Kripke frames, by a
theorem of Fine [4].
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(i) x ≤ f(x), and if x < y then
f(x) ≤ y,
(ii) if f(K) ⊆ K then ↑K ⊆ K,
(iii) x0 ≤ x,
(iv) f(x) 6= x0.
The dual algebra of a (♦,X, I)-space (X,≤, f, x0) is defined to be the tuple
(A,♦,X, I), where A is the Boolean algebra of clopen subsets of X , and for any
K ∈ A, ♦K := ↓K, XK := f−1(K), and I := {x0}.
We now prove our representation theorem for (♦,X, I)-algebras.
Theorem 3.4. The class of (♦,X, I)-algebras coincides with the class of al-
gebras that are isomorphic to the dual algebra of a (♦,X, I)-space.
Proof. Note that, in any (♦,X, I)-algebra, I is an atom: let ⊥ < a ≤ I be
arbitrary. Then I ≤ ♦a by Def. 2.1(iii). Also, ♦I ≤ I by Def. 2.1(ii) and (iv).
Using these facts, Def. 2.1(i) and the monotonicity of X and ♦, we obtain that
I ≤ a ∨X♦a ≤ a ∨X♦I ≤ a ∨XI, i.e., I ≤ a by Def. 2.1(iv), as required.
Now, by the Jo´nsson-Tarski representation theorem (see, e.g., [1, Section 5.3]),
the class of algebras (A,♦,X, I) where (A,♦) is an S4-algebra, X is an endo-
morphism, and I is an atom of A, coincides with the class of algebras that are
isomorphic to the dual algebra of a tuple of the form (X,≤, f, x0), where X is a
Boolean space, ≤ is a topological preorder on X , f is a continuous function on
X and x0 ∈ X is such that {x0} is clopen.
It remains to prove that (X, f,≤, x0) validates (i)-(iv) in the definition of
(♦,X, I)-space if, and only if, its dual algebra A is a (♦,X, I)-algebra. This
follows from the following claim.
Claim. The following equivalences hold.
(a) x ≤ f(x) for all x ∈ X ⇐⇒ X♦a ≤ ♦a for all a ∈ A.
(b) if x < y then f(x) ≤ y for all x, y ∈ X ⇐⇒ ♦a ≤ a ∨X♦a for all a ∈ A.
(c) (X, f,≤) validates (ii) in Definition 3.3 ⇐⇒ A validates (ii) in Defini-
ton 2.1.
(d) x0 ≤ x for all x ∈ X ⇐⇒ I ≤ ♦a for all a ∈ A \ {⊥}.
(e) f(x) 6= x0 for all x ∈ X ⇐⇒ XI = ⊥.
Proof of Claim. (a) (⇒) Let a ∈ A be arbitrary, and suppose that x ∈ X♦a.
Then f(x) ∈ ♦a, and x ≤ f(x), so x ∈ ♦a.
(⇐) Suppose that x  f(x) for some x ∈ X . Since ↑x is closed, there exists a
clopen set a ∈ A such that f(x) ∈ a and ↑x ∩ a = ∅. In particular, f(x) ∈ ♦a,
so x ∈ X♦a, but x 6∈ ♦a.
(b) (⇒) Let a ∈ A be arbitrary, and suppose that x ∈ ♦a but x 6∈ a. Since
x ∈ ♦a, pick y ≥ x such that y ∈ a. Since x 6∈ a, we have x 6= y, so f(x) ≤ y.
Hence, x ∈ X♦a.
(⇐) Suppose that there exist x, y ∈ X such that x < y, but f(x)  y. Since
↑f(x) is closed, pick a1 ∈ A such that y ∈ a1 and ↑f(x) ∩ a1 = ∅. Since x 6= y,
pick a2 ∈ A such that y ∈ a2 and x 6∈ a2. Let a := a1 ∩ a2. Note that x ∈ ♦a,
since x ≤ y and y ∈ a. However, we have x 6∈ a, and x 6∈ X♦a, contrary to the
assumption that ♦a ≤ a ∨X♦a for all a ∈ A.
(c) Note that f(K) ⊆ K if, and only if, f−1(Kc) ⊆ Kc, and that ↑K ⊆ K if,
and only if, ↓(Kc) ⊆ Kc. The stated equivalence now follows from the definitions
of X and ♦.
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(d) (⇒) If a ∈ A \ {⊥}, then there is x ∈ a. Since x0 ≤ x, it follows that
I = {x0} ≤ ♦a.
(⇐) If x0  x, pick a ∈ A such that x ∈ a and ↑x0 ∩ a = ∅. Then a 6= ⊥, but
x0 6∈ ♦a, so I  ♦a.
(e) Clear from the definitions. ⊣
We may use the representation theorem, Theorem 3.4, to prove the following
proposition, which will be used in the proof of Lemma 3.8.
Proposition 3.5. Any (♦,X, I)-algebra validates the equations
(Con) ✷(✷a→ b) ∨ ✷(✷b→ a) = ⊤,
(Dum) ✷(✷(a→ ✷a)→ a) ∧ ♦✷a ≤ a.
Moreover, the preorder on any (♦,X, I)-space is linear.
Proof. Let A be a (♦,X, I)-algebra dual to a (♦,X, I)-space (X,≤, f, x0).
(Con) Let a, b ∈ A be arbitrary, and write K := ♦¬(✷a → b) ∧ ♦¬(✷b → a),
the complement of ✷(✷a → b) ∨ ✷(✷b → a). We need to show that K = ∅.
We prove first that f(K) ⊆ K. If x ∈ K, pick y ∈ ¬(✷a → b) = ✷a ∧ ¬b and
z ∈ ¬(✷b → a) = ✷b ∧ ¬a with y, z ≥ x. Then y 6= x, since y ∈ ✷a but z 6∈ a,
while x ≤ z. So f(x) ≤ y. Similarly, f(x) ≤ z, so f(x) ∈ K. By Def. 3.3(ii),
we obtain that ↑K ⊆ K. Now, if we would also have that K 6= ∅, then there
would exist x ∈ K and y ≥ x such that y ∈ ✷a ∧ ¬b. But then y ∈ ✷(✷b → a),
so y 6∈ K, contradicting that ↑K ⊆ K. Therefore, we must have K = ∅, as
required.
(Dum) Let a ∈ A be arbitrary. We will prove ✷(✷(a→ ✷a)→ a)∧♦✷a ≤ ✷a,
from which (Dum) follows since ✷a ≤ a. The method is the same as before. Let
us write K := ✷(✷(a→ ✷a)→ a) ∧ ♦✷a ∧ ¬✷a. We need to show that K = ∅.
We prove first that f(K) ⊆ K. Let x ∈ K be arbitrary. Pick y ≥ x such
that y 6∈ a, and pick z ≥ x such that z ∈ ✷a. Then z 6= x, so f(x) ≤ z, and
f(x) ∈ ♦✷a. Also, since ↑(✷b) ⊆ ✷b holds for any b, and x ≤ f(x), we have
f(x) ∈ ✷(✷(a → ✷a) → a). It remains to prove that f(x) ∈ ¬✷a. If y 6= x,
then f(x) ≤ y, and we are done. Otherwise, we have that y = x, so x 6∈ a. Since
x ∈ ✷(a → ✷a) → a, pick w ≥ x such that w ∈ a and w ∈ ¬✷a. Then w 6= x,
so f(x) ≤ w, so f(x) ∈ ¬✷a, as required. Again, by Def. 3.3(ii), we obtain
↑K ⊆ K, and if K were non-empty, we would have x ∈ K and z ≥ x such that
z ∈ ✷a, but then z 6∈ K, contradiction. So K = ∅, as required.
Finally, since (Con) holds in A, the preorder ≤ is connected, i.e., for any
z, x, y ∈ X , if z ≤ x and z ≤ y, then x ≤ y or y ≤ x (see, e.g., [1, Ex. 4.3.3]).
Since the (♦,X, I)-space (X,≤, f, x0) has a minimum element, x0, it follows that
the preorder is linear. ⊣
We now turn to the filtration argument. The following syntactic lemma, which
allows us to rewrite terms into negation normal form, will be useful. We call an
L-term a literal if it is either a variable, a constant (⊥ or I), a negated variable
or a negated constant. An L-term is in negation normal form (NNF) if it is built
up from literals by repeated applications of ∨, ∧, ♦, ✷ and X.
Lemma 3.6. For any L-term t, there exists an L-term t′ in negative normal
form such that T ⊢ t = t′.
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Proof. By induction on the complexity of the L-term t, we can push any
negation inwards, making use of the following T -provable equalities: ¬(s1∨s2) =
¬s1∧¬s2, ¬(s1∧s2) = ¬s1∨¬s2, ¬♦s = ✷¬s, ¬✷s = ♦¬s and ¬Xs = X¬s. ⊣
Definition 3.7. A finite set Γ of NNF L-terms is filterable if
(i) Γ contains I,
(ii) Γ is closed under subterms,
(iii) whenever Γ contains ♦s for some term s, Γ also contains X♦s,
(iv) whenever Γ contains ✷s for some term s, Γ also contains X✷s.
Lemma 3.8. Let Γ be a filterable set, and denote by v1, . . . , vN the variables
occurring in Γ. For any (♦,X, I)-space (X, f,≤X , x0) with dual algebra A and
a ∈ AN , there exists p ∈ P(ω)N with the following property: for any x ∈ X,
there is nx ∈ ω such that for all s ∈ Γ,
if x ∈ sA(a) then nx ∈ s
P(ω)(p). (⋆)
Proof. Let (X, f,≤X , x0) be a (♦,X, I)-space and let a ∈ A
N . Throughout
this proof, if x ∈ X and s is a term, we will write “x ∈ s” as shorthand for
“x ∈ sA(a)”.
Let ∼ be the equivalence relation on X defined by
x ∼ x′ ⇐⇒ for all s ∈ Γ : x ∈ s if, and only if x′ ∈ s.
Since Γ is finite, X/∼ is finite. We write Y := X/∼ and q : X ։ Y for the
quotient map. Note that q is continuous with respect to the discrete topology on
Y , since each equivalence class [x]∼ is clopen: it can be described by the formula∧
x∈γ∈Γ γ ∧
∧
x 6∈γ∈Γ ¬γ.
We will define three relations, F , ≤Y and , on the quotient Y . First, define
the relation F by:
yFy′ ⇐⇒ there exists x ∈ X such that q(x) = y and q(f(x)) = y′,
that is, F is the smallest filtration of the (functional) relation f on X , cf., e.g.,
[1, Lem. 2.40]. Let ≤Y be the reflexive and transitive closure of F , i.e.,
y ≤Y y
′ ⇐⇒ there exist m ≥ 0 and z0, . . . , zm ∈ Y such that
z0 = y, zm = y
′, and ziFzi+1 for all 0 ≤ i < m.
Finally, we define a relation  on Y by
y  y′ ⇐⇒ for all x ∈ X, if q(x) = y, then there exists
x′ ∈ X such that x ≤ x′ and q(x) = y′.
In the following claim, we collect several properties of the three relations de-
fined above. In particular, (i) & (ii) show that F is a filtration of f , (iii) &
(iv) show that ≤Y is a filtration of ≤X , (v)–(viii) provide detailed properties of
the relation  that we need in our construction, and (ix) & (x) show that the
properties of the minimum element x0 are preserved in (Y,).
Claim 1. For any x, x′ ∈ X , y, y′ ∈ Y , the following hold.
(i) q(x)Fq(f(x)).
(ii) whenever Xt ∈ Γ, if q(x)Fq(x′) then x ∈ Xt if, and only if, x′ ∈ t.
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(iii) if x ≤X x′, then q(x) ≤Y q(x′).
(iv) whenever ✷t ∈ Γ, if q(x) ≤Y q(x′) and x ∈ ✷t, then x′ ∈ t.
(v)  is a linear preorder.
(vi) if y  y′, then y ≤Y y′.
(vii) whenever ♦t ∈ Γ, if x ∈ ♦t then there exists w such that q(x)  q(w) and
w ∈ t.
(viii) if y  y′ and y′  y, then either y = y′, or z  y for all z ∈ Y .
(ix) q(x) = q(x0) if, and only if, x = x0.
(x) q(x0)  y and not yFq(x0).
Proof of Claim 1. (i) and (ii) are standard, cf. e.g. [1, Lem. 2.40].
(iii) Note that it suffices to prove that Ky := {x′ ∈ X | y ≤Y q(x′)} is an
up-set in ≤X for any y ∈ Y . Notice that Ky is clopen, since q is continuous
and Y is finite. To show that Ky is an up-set, by Def 3.3(ii), it suffices to prove
that f(Ky) ⊆ Ky. Indeed, if x′ ∈ Ky, then y ≤Y q(x′)Fq(f(x′)), and ≤Y is a
transitive relation containing F , so q(f(x′)) ∈ Ky.
(iv) Suppose that ✷t ∈ Γ and x ∈ ✷t. By induction on m, using that X✷t ∈ Γ
since Γ is filterable, one can prove that if there exists an F -path of length m
from q(x) to q(x′), then x′ ∈ ✷t. Now, if q(x) ≤Y q(x′), then by definition of
≤Y there exists an F -path from q(x) to q(x′), so x′ ∈ ✷t. In particular, x′ ∈ t.
(v) Reflexivity and transitivity are straight-forward to prove. For linearity,
suppose that y 6 y′. Pick x ∈ X such that q(x) = y and for any x′ such that
q(x′) = y′, we have x X x′. Since ≤X is linear (Prop. 3.5), we have x′ ≤X x
for any x′ such that q(x′) = y′, so y′  y.
(vi) Suppose that y  y′. Pick x ∈ X such that q(x) = y. By definition of ,
pick x′ ≥X x such that q(x′) = y′. By (iii), we have y = q(x) ≤Y q(x′) = y′.
(vii) Suppose that ♦t ∈ Γ and x ∈ ♦t. Let T := {y ∈ Y | q(x) 6 y}. For each
y ∈ T , we have q(x) 6 y, so pick xy ∈ X such that q(xy) = q(x) and, for any
w such that q(w) = y, we have xy  w. Since ≤X is linear (Prop. 3.5), choose
an enumeration y0, . . . , ym of the elements of T such that xy0 ≤X · · · ≤X xym .
Since x ∈ ♦t ∈ Γ and xym ∼ x, we have xym ∈ ♦t. Pick w ≥X xym such that
w ∈ t. Note that q(w) 6∈ T : otherwise, we would have q(w) = yj for some yj ∈ T ,
and xyj ≤X xym ≤X w, contradicting the choice of xyj . Therefore, since  is
linear by (v), we must have q(x)  q(w), as required.
(viii) Suppose that y  y′, y 6= y′ and that there exists z ∈ Y such that z 6 y.
We prove that y′ 6 y. Let a := {v ∈ X | q(v) 6= y}, a clopen subset of X since
q is continuous. Pick an element x ∈ X such that q(x) = y, i.e., x 6∈ a. We note
first that x ∈ ♦✷a: since z 6 y, pick w ∈ X such that q(w) = z and, whenever
w ≤X v, q(v) 6= y. Now w ∈ ✷a, so w 6≤X x, and hence x ≤X w since ≤X is
linear. Now, since A verifies (Dum) (Prop. 3.5), x 6∈ a, and x ∈ ♦✷a, we obtain
x 6∈ ✷(✷(a → ✷a) → a). Pick x1 ≥X x such that x1 ∈ ✷(a → ✷a) and x1 6∈ a.
By definition of a, we have q(x1) = y  y′, so we may pick x2 ≥X x1 such that
q(x2) = y
′. Since y 6= y′, we have x2 ∈ a. Thus, since x1 ∈ ✷(a → ✷a), and
x1 ≤X x2, we obtain x2 ∈ ✷a. In particular, there is no v ≥X x2 such that
q(v) = y, so y′ 6 y, as required.
(ix) If q(x) = q(x0), then since x0 ∈ I and I ∈ Γ, we have x ∈ I. Therefore,
x = x0.
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(x) By (ix) and the fact that x0 ≤X x for any x ∈ X , it is clear that q(x0)  y
for any y ∈ Y . If we would have yFq(x0), then there would exist x ∈ X such
that q(x) = y and q(f(x)) = q(x0). However, by (ix) we would get f(x) = x0,
contradicting Def. 3.3(iv). ⊣
We will write ≡ for the equivalence relation induced by , i.e., y ≡ y′ if, and
only if, y  y′ and y′  y. By Claim 1(viii), the preorder (Y,) is a “balloon”,
i.e., there exist α ≥ 0, β ≥ 1 and an enumeration y0, . . . , yα, . . . , yα+β−1 of the
elements of Y such that, for 0 ≤ i ≤ α − 1, yi  yi+1 and yi+1 6 yi, and for
0 ≤ j, j′ ≤ β − 1, yα+j ≡ yα+j′ . In a picture:
y0

y1

y2
 . . . 
yα−1

yα
≡ . . . ≡
yα+β−1
As a convenient notation, we extend this enumeration of the elements of Y to
an infinite sequence, by defining yα+γ := yα+(γ mod β) for any γ ≥ β.
We now define a function σ : ω → Y and a strictly increasing sequence of
natural numbers (ℓi)i∈ω with the following properties:
(i) σ(n)Fσ(n+ 1) for all n,
(ii) σ(ℓi) = yi for all i.
Let σ(0) := y0 and ℓ0 := 0. Assume that ℓi and σ(n) have been defined correctly
for all n ≤ ℓi. Since yi  yi+1, by Claim 1(vi), we have yi ≤Y yi+1, so we
may pick m > 0, σ(ℓi + 1), . . . , σ(ℓi + m) ∈ Y with σ(ℓi + m) = yi+1 and
σ(ℓi + j)Fσ(ℓi + j + 1) for all 0 ≤ j < m. Define ℓi+1 := ℓi +m. Note that we
may indeed arrange the choice so that m > 0: if yi 6= yi+1, this is automatic,
and if yi = yi+1 then β = 1 and i ≥ α; in this case first choose any σ(ℓi+1) ∈ Y
so that yiFσ(ℓi + 1), and then choose an F -path from σ(ℓi + 1) to yi = yi+1,
which can be done since σ(ℓi + 1)  yi so σ(ℓi + 1) ≤Y yi by Claim 1(vi).
Finally, we define the valuation p ∈ P(ω)N by setting, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ N ,
pj := {n ∈ ω | σ(n) = q(x) for some x ∈ aj}.
The fact that (⋆) in the statement of Lemma 3.8 is true for this choice of p
will follow from the following claim and the fact that σ is surjective, by property
(ii) of σ.
Claim 2. For any s ∈ Γ,
for any x ∈ X,n ∈ ω, if q(x) = σ(n) and x ∈ sA(a), then n ∈ sP(ω)(p). (Ps)
Proof of Claim 2. By induction on s, which is in negation normal form by
assumption.
(s = vj .) If q(x) = σ(n) and x ∈ aj then n ∈ pj by definition.
(s = ¬vj .) If q(x) = σ(n) and x ∈ ¬vj , then x 6∈ aj. Since vj ∈ Γ, for any x′
with σ(n) = q(x′), we have x′ ∼ x, so x′ 6∈ aj. Hence, n 6∈ pj , so n ∈ ¬pj .
(s = I.) If q(x) = σ(n) and x ∈ I then x = x0. Then σ(n) = q(x0) = y0, since
q(x0)  q(x) for all x by Claim 1(x). If we would have n > 0, then we would get
σ(n− 1)Fy0, which is impossible by Claim 1(x). So n = 0 ∈ I.
(s = ¬I.) If q(x) = σ(n) and x ∈ ¬I then x 6= x0. By Claim 1(ix), q(x) 6= y0.
Thus, σ(n) 6= y0, so in particular n 6= 0, so n ∈ ¬I.
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(s = s1 ∨ s2) and (s = s1 ∧ s2) are straight-forward.
(s = Xt.) Suppose that q(x) = σ(n) and x ∈ Xt. Since σ(n)Fσ(n + 1), pick
x′ such that q(x′) = σ(n) = q(x) and q(f(x′)) = σ(n+1). Since x ∈ Xt, Xt ∈ Γ,
and q(x) = q(x′), we have x′ ∈ Xt, so f(x′) ∈ t. By the induction hypothesis
(Pt), we get n+ 1 ∈ t, so n ∈ Xt = s.
(s = ✷t.) Suppose that q(x) = σ(n) and x ∈ ✷t. Let m ≥ n be arbitrary,
and pick x′ such that q(x′) = σ(m). It follows from property (i) of σ that
q(x) = σ(n) ≤Y σ(m) = q(x′). By Claim 1(iv), we have x′ ∈ t. Applying the
induction hypothesis (Pt) to x
′ and m, we obtain m ∈ t. Since m was arbitrary,
we conclude that n ∈ ✷t.
(s = ♦t.) Suppose that q(x) = σ(n) and x ∈ ♦t. We need to prove that
n ∈ ♦t, i.e., that there exists k ≥ 0 such that n+ k ∈ t. We first prove that, for
any k, if n + i 6∈ t for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, then q−1(σ(n + k)) ⊆ ♦t. For k = 0, this
is clear, because x ∈ ♦t ∈ Γ. For the induction step, if the statement holds for
some k, assume that q(x′) = σ(n + k + 1) and n + i 6∈ t for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k + 1.
Pick some x′′ such that q(x′′) = σ(n + k). Then x′′ ∈ ♦t by the statement for
k, and x′′ 6∈ t, for otherwise (Pt) would give n+ k ∈ t. Therefore, by Def. 2.1(i),
x′′ ∈ X♦t, and X♦t ∈ Γ since Γ is filterable. By Claim 1(ii) and the fact that
q(x′′) = σ(n+ k)Fσ(n+ k + 1) = q(x′), we obtain x′ ∈ ♦t.
Now, since σ visits yα infinitely often, pick ℓ ≥ 0 such that σ(n + ℓ) = yα. If
n+ i ∈ t for some 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, then we are done. Otherwise, pick some u ∈ X such
that q(u) = yα; by the previous paragraph, u ∈ ♦t. By Claim 1(vii), pick w ∈ X
such that yα  q(w) and w ∈ t. Then q(w) = yα+j for some 0 ≤ j ≤ β − 1.
Since σ visits yα+j infinitely often, pick k ≥ ℓ such that σ(n+k) = yα+j = q(w).
Then n+ k ∈ t by (Pt). ⊣
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 3.2, which, by the remarks pre-
ceding it, finishes the proof that T ∗ is a companion of T .
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let t(v1, . . . , vN ) be any L-term, and assume that
P(ω) |= t = ⊤. By Lemma 3.6, let u be an NNF L-term that is equivalent to ¬t.
Let Sub(u) denote the set of subterms of the term u, and let Γ be the filterable
set
Γ := {s | s ∈ Sub(u)} ∪ {X♦s | ♦s ∈ Sub(u)} ∪ {X✷s | ✷s ∈ Sub(u)} ∪ {I}.
Indeed, Γ is finite, and any element of Γ is in negation normal form.
Let A be a (♦,X, I)-algebra and let a ∈ AN be arbitrary; we prove that
tA(a) = ⊤A. By Theorem 3.4, there exists a (♦,X, I)-space (X,≤, f, x0) with
dual algebra (isomorphic to)A. Choose p ∈ P(ω)n with property (⋆) of Lemma 3.8.
Let x ∈ X be arbitrary. Pick nx ∈ ω as in Lemma 3.8. Then nx ∈ tP(ω)(p),
since P(ω) |= t = ⊤, so nx 6∈ (¬t)P(ω)(p) = uP(ω)(p). Hence, since u ∈ Γ, we
also have x 6∈ uA(a) = (¬t)A(a), by the property (⋆) in Lemma 3.8. Therefore,
x ∈ tA(A). Since x was arbitrary, it follows that tA(a) = X = ⊤A. ⊣
§4. T ∗ is model complete. Let ϕ be a first-order formula in the signature
of (♦,X, I)-algebras. We need to show that ϕ is equivalent to an existential
formula ϕ′ in T ∗, the first-order theory of P(ω). We will proceed according to
the following scheme.
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(i) Syntactically transform ϕ into a formula ϕ̂ of the monadic second-order
logic S1S (Proposition 4.2).
(ii) Associate to the S1S-formula ϕ̂ a Bu¨chi automaton Aϕ̂ (Theorem 4.5).
(iii) Associate to the Bu¨chi automaton Aϕ̂ a (♦,X, I)-term tAϕ̂ representing it
(Proposition 4.7).
(iv) Use an appropriate renaming of variables to obtain an existential formula
ϕ′ equivalent to ϕ (Subsection 4.4).
We now perform each of the steps in Subsections 4.1–4.4 below.
4.1. From first-order to S1S. Let us recall a definition of the syntax and
semantics of the monadic second-order logic S1S (see, e.g., [11, Ch. 12] for more
details and background).
Definition 4.1. The set S1S(V) of S1S-formulae with free variables con-
tained in a set V is the smallest set such that:
(i) for each P,Q ∈ V , the formulae P ⊆ Q and S(P,Q) are in S1S(V),
(ii) if ϕ and ψ are in S1S(V), then ϕ ∨ ψ and ¬ϕ are in S1S(V),
(iii) if ϕ is in S1S(V) and R is in V then ∃Rϕ is in S1S(V \ {R}).
The satisfaction relation |= ⊆ P(ω)V × S1S(V) is defined inductively by
(i) v |= P ⊆ Q if, and only if, v(P ) ⊆ v(Q),
v |= S(P,Q) if, and only if, there exists n ∈ P such that n+ 1 ∈ Q,
(ii) v |= ϕ ∨ ψ if, and only if, v |= ϕ or v |= ψ,
v |= ¬ϕ if, and only if, v |= ϕ does not hold,
(iii) v |= ∃Rϕ if, and only if, there exists a variant v′ of v, differing from v only
for the value of R, such that v′ |= ϕ.
Recall [11, Def. 12.5] that a quantification over an individual variable, ∃xϕ,
can be encoded in S1S as a quantification ∃x(sing(x) ∧ ϕ), where sing(x) is an
S1S-formula expressing that v(x) must be a singleton for any valuation v. We
use the convention that lowercase letters x, y, . . . are individual variables, while
capital letters P , Q, R, . . . are set variables. We will also make use of the stan-
dard abbreviations x ∈ P , P = Q, x ≤ y, S(x, y), as in [11, Ch. 12].
Notation. In order to avoid confusion, we need to distinguish the function
symbols ∨, ¬, ⊥ in the first-order signature L of (♦,X, I)-algebras from the
symbols ∨, ¬, ⊥ that occur as connectives in first-order L-formulae and in S1S-
formulae. Therefore, throughout this section, we use an alternative first-order
signature L∗ := {∪,−, ∅,♦,X, I} for (♦,X, I)-algebras, as well as abbreviations
a ∩ b := −(−a ∪−b) and a⇒ b := −a ∪ b.
We now come to the translation from first-order L∗-formulas to formulas in
the logic S1S. This translation is a variant of the so-called standard translation
of modal logic into monadic second-order logic, cf., e.g., [1, Prop. 3.12].
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Proposition 4.2. For any first-order L∗-formula ϕ(p1, . . . , pn), there exists
an S1S-formula ϕ̂(P1, . . . , Pn) such that, for any v ∈ P(ω)n,3
P(ω), v |= ϕ if, and only if, v |= ϕ̂. (1)
Proof. We first inductively define, for any L∗-term t(p1, . . . , pn), an S1S-
formula t•(P1, . . . , Pn, x), where x is a fresh individual variable, as follows:
• (pi)• := x ∈ Pi,
• (t ∪ u)• := t•(x) ∨ u•(x),
• (−t)• := ¬(t•)(x),
• ∅• := ¬(x = x),
• (♦t)• := ∃y(x ≤ y ∧ t•(P1, . . . , Pn, y)),
• (Xt)• := ∃y(S(x, y) ∧ t•(P1, . . . , Pn, y)),
• I• := ∀z(x ≤ z).
Note that, for any i ∈ ω and v ∈ P(ω)n, we have
i ∈ tP(ω)(v(1), . . . , v(n)) if, and only if, v |= t•(v(1), . . . , v(n), i). (2)
Now, for any L∗-formula ϕ(p1, . . . , pn), define ϕ̂(P1, . . . , Pn) by replacing any
atomic formula t = u by ∀x(t•(P1, . . . , Pn, x) ↔ u•(P1, . . . , Pn, x)), and any
occurrence of ∃p by ∃P . The claimed equivalence is proved by an easy induction
on the complexity of ϕ, using (2) for the base case. ⊣
4.2. From S1S-formula to Bu¨chi automaton. We briefly recall the defini-
tion of finite automata and the Bu¨chi acceptance condition. See, e.g., [11, Ch. 1]
for more details.
Definition 4.3. Let Σ be a finite alphabet. A (finite, non-deterministic)
automaton is a tuple A = (Q, δ, q0, F ) where Q is a finite set, whose elements
are called states, q0 ∈ Q is a distinguished element called the initial state, F ⊆
Q is a set, whose elements are called final states, and δ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q is a
ternary relation, called the transition relation. For an infinite word w ∈ Σω, a
function ρ : ω → Q is called a run of A on w if ρ(0) = q0 and, for any i ∈ ω,
(ρ(i), w(i), ρ(i + 1)) ∈ δ. For any word w ∈ Σω, the automaton A Bu¨chi-accepts
w if, and only if, there exist a run ρ of A on w and a final state qf ∈ F such
that the set {i ∈ ω | ρ(i) = qf} is infinite.
We next recall how valuations of variables naturally define infinite words.
Definition 4.4. Let n ≥ 0 and Σ := P({1, . . . , n}). For any v ∈ P(ω)n, we
define the infinite word wv ∈ Σω by
wv(i) := v
−1({u ∈ Σ | i ∈ u}) = {k | i ∈ v(k)}, i ∈ ω.
The following theorem, originally due to Bu¨chi [2], states that any S1S-formula
can be converted into an automaton.
3Note that the symbol |= is used with two different meanings in (1): on the left-hand-side,
it denotes the usual satisfaction relation of first-order logic, while on the right-hand-side it
denotes the satisfaction relation of S1S of Definition 4.1. Similarly, the tuple v ∈ P(ω)n is
regarded on the left as a valuation of the first-order variables p1, . . . , pn, and on the right as a
valuation of the second-order variables P1, . . . , Pn.
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Theorem 4.5. For any S1S-formula ψ(P1, . . . , Pn), there exists an automaton
Aψ on the finite alphabet Σ := P({1, . . . , n}) such that, for any v ∈ P(ω)n,
v |= ψ if, and only if, Aψ Bu¨chi-accepts wv, (3)
Proof. See, e.g., [11, Thm. 12.15] or [15, Thm. 5.9]. ⊣
4.3. From automata to existential formulae. It is well-known that a
Bu¨chi automaton can be transformed into a formula of S1S which starts with
a block of existential monadic set quantifiers, but also has some quantifications
over individual variables after that. As we remarked in the introduction to the
paper, we require slightly more, namely that the quantifications over individual
variables are not needed in the signature L∗.
In order to state precisely the translation back from a Bu¨chi automaton to an
existential L∗-formula, we need to recall how infinite words in Σω yield valuations
of Σ in P(ω), by the reverse process to Definition 4.4.
Definition 4.6. Let Σ be a finite alphabet. For any w ∈ Σω, we define the
valuation vw : Σ→ P(ω) by
vw(a) := w
−1(a) = {i ∈ ω : w(i) = a}, a ∈ Σ.
Let A = (Q, δ, q0, F ) be an automaton on a finite alphabet Σ. We now define a
number of L∗-terms with variables from the set Q∪Σ. First define the L∗-terms:
• Init := I ⇒ q0,
• Trans :=
⋂
q∈Q
(
q ⇒
⋃
(q,a,q′)∈δ(a ∩Xq
′)
)
,
• Part :=
⋃
q∈Q(q ∩
⋂
q′∈Q
q′ 6=q
−q′),
• Accept :=
⋃
q∈F ♦q,
and define the L∗-term tA by:
tA(a, q) := Part ∩ Init ∩ Trans ∩ Accept. (4)
Proposition 4.7. Let A be an automaton on a finite alphabet Σ. For any
w ∈ Σω,
A Bu¨chi-accepts w if, and only if, P(ω), vw |= ∃q (tA = ⊤). (5)
Proof. Clear from the definitions. ⊣
4.4. Proof that T ∗ is model complete. Let ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) be a first-order
L∗-formula. Let ϕ̂(P1, . . . , Pn) be the S1S-formula given by Proposition 4.2. Let
Aϕ̂ be the automaton on the alphabet Σ := P(1, . . . , n) = {a1, . . . , a2n} given by
Theorem 4.5. Let tAϕ̂ be the L
∗-term defined in (4). We define the existential
L∗-formula
ϕ′(p1, . . . , pn) := ∃a ∃q

(tAϕ̂ = ⊤) ∧
2n∧
ℓ=1

aℓ = ⋂
k∈aℓ
pk ∩
⋂
k 6∈aℓ
−pk



 .
Claim. T ∗ ⊢ ϕ↔ ϕ′.
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Proof. It suffices to prove that P(ω), v |= ϕ if, and only if, P(ω), v |= ϕ′, for
any v ∈ P(ω)n. Let v ∈ P(ω)n be arbitrary. We obtain:
P(ω), v |= ϕ ⇐⇒ v |= ϕ̂ (by (1) in Prop. 4.2)
⇐⇒ Aϕ̂ accepts wv (by (3) in Thm. 4.5)
⇐⇒ P(ω), vwv |= ∃q (tAϕ̂ = ⊤) (by (5) in Prop. 4.7)
⇐⇒ P(ω), v |= ϕ′,
where the last equivalence follows from the fact that, for each a ∈ Σ = P(1, . . . , n),
we have
vwv (a) = {i ∈ ω : a = {k : i ∈ v(k)}} =
⋂
k∈a
v(k) ∩
⋂
k 6∈a
−v(k).
⊣
§5. Conclusions and future work. In this paper, we characterizedmonadic
second order logic on infinite words as the model companion of the universal class
of (♦,X, I)-algebras. This is not a stand-alone result; we indicate a few of the
possible directions of further research here.
First, we expect that it is possible to give a similar characterization of monadic
second order logic on finite words, by adjusting the axiomatization of (♦,X, I)-
algebras in the appropriate manner. A harder, but equally natural question, is
whether a version of our result holds for monadic second order logics on tree
structures, such as S2S, or finite trees.
Our result (and/or its incarnation for finite words) is likely to be related to
the duality theory for regular languages and logics that is being developed in a
series of papers including [6, 7]. It would be interesting to make these connections
explicit, in order to determine if the two approaches can benefit from each other.
Riba [13] gives a model-theoretic proof of the completeness of Siefkes’ axioma-
tization of S1S. Our result in this paper entails that S1S, viewed as a first-order
theory, coincides with the theory of the existentially closed (♦,X, I)-algebras
[16, Thm. B]. Therefore, we suggest that an alternative axiomatization of S1S,
and completeness proof for it, could be sought by axiomatizing existentially
closed (♦,X, I)-algebras. In a similar direction, we note that Gheerbrant and
Ten Cate [8] used modal logic techniques to axiomatize monadic second order
logic on finite trees, and fragments. An extension of our results in this paper to
finite trees could also be connected to the results in [8].
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an earlier version of this paper.
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